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Introduction
FOR NEARLY THREE DECADES, the Supreme Court emphasized
principles of comity, federalism, and finality in its attempt to limit the
availability of federal habeas corpus relief1 as a collateral attack2 on a
state prisoner’s criminal conviction and sentence.3 On April 24, 1996,
the Court’s prayers were answered. On that date, former President
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1. A petition for the writ of habeas corpus can be described as follows:
[A] habeas corpus proceeding is one to ascertain whether a prisoner can lawfully
be detained in custody and to secure that prisoner’s release if he or she is unlaw-
fully detained. . . . [T]he fact that the state may seek a new judgment, through a
new trial or a new sentencing proceeding, is beside the point. The writ commands
a sheriff, marshal or jailer to have the body of the prisoner before the issuing
court at a certain time and place, together with an explanation of the cause of the
imprisonment. The function of the writ is to search through all forms to the suffi-
ciency of the cause of detention. In short, the writ forces the government to jus-
tify a decision to hold an individual in custody. Prompt resolution of prisoners’
claims is a principal function of the habeas corpus procedure.
15 CYC. OF FED. PROC. § 86:3 (3d ed. 2006) (footnotes omitted).
2. See generally U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (guaranteeing the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, except in times of rebellion or invasion when the public safety requires it).
The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred habeas corpus jurisdiction upon the federal judiciary.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82. A person in custody in state prison may
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003); Duncan v. Walker, 533
U.S. 167, 178 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000); Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991); Harris v. Reed,
489 U.S. 255, 264 (1989); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539 (1976). For a brief
discussion of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ stance on federal habeas review, followed
by a list of decisions that outline cutbacks on habeas corpus see John H. Blume, AEDPA:
The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 265–70 (2006).
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Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”).4 Although AEDPA included an array of habeas re-
form provisions,5 § 2254(d)–(d)(1) is of particular importance, which
provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the mer-
its in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an un-
reasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .6
In Williams v. Taylor,7 the Supreme Court analyzed the new stan-
dard that Congress imposed on the federal courts for reviewing a state
prisoner’s conviction or sentence in federal habeas corpus cases.8 The
Court interpreted the language of § 2254(d)(1) as follows:
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant
the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that
reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state
court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a
set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable
application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the
state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from
[the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.
. . . .
[T]he meaning of the phrase “clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” . . . refers
to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s
decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. . . . The
one caveat, as the statutory language makes clear, is that
§ 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to [the
Supreme] Court’s jurisprudence.9
This standard, which requires a federal habeas court to compare
the state court’s decision with Supreme Court-defined federal law, un-
4. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
5. For a general overview of AEDPA’s provisions see RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEB-
MAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3.2 (6th ed. 2011).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)–(d)(1) (2006). Section 2254(d)(2) prohibits the granting of
a writ of habeas corpus if the state court adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision
that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” § 2254(d)(2). This Comment, however, is solely
focused on the standard of review for state court determinations under Section
2254(d)(1). See discussion infra note 28.
7. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 412–13 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
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questionably constitutes a vast departure from pre-AEDPA case law.10
Furthermore, even if a state court’s decision is found to be “contrary
to” Supreme Court precedent, relief is not automatically granted. In
Brecht v. Abrahamson,11 the Supreme Court famously held that habeas
corpus relief may only be granted after determining there was error
and the error had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict.’”12 That is, the error must result in “ac-
tual prejudice.”13
Williams and Brecht teach us that § 2254(d)(1) requires the grant
of federal habeas corpus relief only if: (1) the state court’s determina-
tion of a federal claim—both pure questions of law as well as mixed
questions of law and fact—squarely contradicts a holding by the Su-
preme Court; and (2) but for this constitutional error, the habeas pe-
titioner would have been acquitted for the offense or offenses
charged.
While the Supreme Court and Congress link arms in agreement
with AEDPA’s standard of review, the “anti-AEDPA’ans” roar in dis-
content. Who, then, will be the new champion of the Great Writ?14
Restricted by such a limited scope of authority to overturn a state
criminal conviction, it is no wonder that scholars argue that federal
courts have failed to provide meaningful relief for state prisoners.15
Yet, many argue that the federal courts, empowered by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, should retain a broader scope of authority over habeas
10. This Comment is not intended to focus on how AEDPA changed federal habeas
corpus jurisprudence; however, it is worth mentioning briefly that prior to AEDPA, a fed-
eral district court did not review a state’s conclusions to determine if they were “objectively
unreasonable” as compared to Supreme Court precedent. Instead, the court would simply
resolve the legal issues on the merits under a de novo standard of review. Miller v. Fenton,
474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985); see also Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 107–10 & n.9 (1995)
(reasoning that mixed questions of law and fact require independent federal determina-
tion); accord Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that
because petitioner’s habeas petition was filed prior to the enactment of AEDPA, the court
reviewed the claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which is considered a mixed
question of law and fact, de novo.).
11. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
12. Id. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
13. Id. To provide a useful comparison, federal courts formerly applied a much
stricter standard on habeas review, which required a court to declare a belief that any error
was “‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’” before denying relief, but now the harmless-
error standard only applies to criminal convictions challenged on direct appeal. Id. at 622
(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
14. The writ of habeas corpus is also known as the “Great Writ.” Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 474 n.6 (1976) (citing Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807)).
15. See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 805–10 (2009); see also infra Part I.A.
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review than AEDPA contemplates and, under various scenarios, review
state prisoner’s federal constitutional claims under a de novo stan-
dard.16 This shift would revert habeas corpus jurisprudence back to
the standard of review used in habeas cases prior to AEDPA.17 On the
other end of the spectrum lies the argument that, because from
AEDPA’s new deferential language Congress already signaled the de-
mise of the more typical habeas corpus petitions, the range of cogniza-
ble claims under habeas review should be drastically narrowed.18
However meritorious these solutions may be, the AEDPA stan-
dard is here to stay. Congress expressed a deliberate intention to re-
strict habeas corpus review.19 Further, not only has the Supreme
Court vocalized its opposition to broad federal habeas relief,20 it has
also held that AEDPA’s restricted standard of review does not violate
the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution,21 separation of pow-
ers principles,22 or federal Article III powers.23
Another school of thought emphasizes not how the federal
courts’ role should change, but how, under AEDPA, it is the state
courts that have a newfound obligation to apply both federal and state
16. For an excellent summary of the discourse on the costs versus benefits of broad
federal habeas review under variations of the de novo standard, see Steven Semeraro, A
Reasoning-Process Review Model for Federal Habeas Corpus, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 897,
907–23 (2004).
17. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Hoffman & King, supra note 154, at 797, 819–33 (proposing that, with
three exceptions, federal habeas should be eliminated entirely for state prisoners in ex-
change for increased government funding to protect criminal defendants’ rights earlier in
the process by improving the quality of defense representation throughout the country);
Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1–9 (2010)
(proposing that, instead of reviewing state convictions for errors in individual cases, the
role of federal habeas courts should be limited to only reviewing claims that allege systemic
state violations—“those that recur in a pattern across multiple cases”).
19. See H.R. REP. NO. 104–518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“This title incorporates
reforms to curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus . . . .”).
20. See Blume, supra note 34.
21. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996).
22. See id. at 664 (“[W]e have long recognized that ‘the power to award the writ by any
of the courts of the United States, must be given by written law,’ and we have likewise
recognized that judgments about the proper scope of the writ are ‘normally for Congress
to make.’” (citations omitted)).
23. The Supreme Court has refused to reverse decisions by the Courts of Appeals on
the ground that upholding Section 2254(d)(1) would violate Article III. See, e.g., Green v.
French, 143 F.3d 865, 874–75 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding Section 2254(d)(1) does not un-
constitutionally limit inferior courts’ independent interpretive authority to determine
meaning of federal law in any Article III case or controversy), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1090
(1999); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 867–70 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (same), rev’d on
other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); accord Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 601 (9th
Cir. 1999).
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law.24 As the writ of habeas corpus still remains the last resort for state
prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their confinement,25 the def-
erential standard of AEDPA leaves the state courts with the responsi-
bility to identify and remedy constitutional errors as they come up at
trial. A natural suggestion that follows is that state courts should ex-
hibit their reasoning in adjudicating a state prisoner’s federal consti-
tutional claims.26 As a further step in line with this obligation,
Professor Steven Semeraro argues for a “Reasoning-Process Review
Model” such that a federal habeas court should only defer to a state
court’s decision on the merits of a federal constitutional claim if the
state court’s reasoning process in getting to that decision indicated
the court actually and correctly applied the appropriate federal law.27
Otherwise, the federal court would be able to remand the case back to
the state to supply a more thorough analysis, and, if the state court
still refused to apply the applicable federal law, the federal courts
would be free to conduct de novo review of the merits on certiorari
review.28
This Comment argues that while the burden should be on the
state courts to become the new champions of the Great Writ, the cur-
rently proposed solutions—whether they suggest de novo review by
the federal court or the ability to remand the case to the state court
for a more thorough analysis of federal constitutional law—do not
provide sufficient enforcement mechanisms that could compel the
state courts to more adequately apply the correct federal law in pre-
sent and future cases. In addition, habeas corpus petitioners remain
bound by the long process of direct and collateral review such that
when the reviewing court—whether it be the higher state or federal
habeas court—finally addresses the federal constitutional claims on
their merits the issues are forgotten, evidence is lost, and memories
have faded.
This Comment proposes that states adopt a post-trial motion or
proceeding that allows a criminal defendant, after being convicted but
24. See, e.g., Charles F. Baird, The Habeas Corpus Revolution: A New Role for State Courts?,
27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 297, 337 (1996); Chris Hutton, The “New” Federal Habeas: Implications for
State Standards of Review, 40 S.D. L. REV. 442, 477 (1995); Ezra Spilke, Comment, Adjudicated
on the Merits?: Why the AEDPA Requires State Courts to Exhibit their Reasoning, 39 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 995 (2006). See also infra Part III.
25. See Bowen v. Johnson, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939) (“It must never be forgotten that the
writ of habeas corpus is the precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher
duty than to maintain it unimpaired.”).
26. Spilke, supra note 24, at 1012.
27. Semeraro, supra note 16, at 900.
28. Id.
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before being sentenced, to raise claims before the trial judge solely
alleging constitutional violations that evolved from trial error.29 Addi-
tionally, this Comment would adopt the statement of decision require-
ment from the civil context such that criminal trial judges would be
required by statute to draft written opinions explaining their constitu-
tional basis for denying a criminal defendant’s motion for a new trial.
AEDPA’s scheme of (practically) unconditional deference can only be
justified if the court that faced the federal constitutional issues when
they first arose is held to answer for the adjudication of those issues.
Only when it can be said that the state trial court appropriately fol-
lowed “clearly established Federal law”30 during initial trial proceed-
ings can the goal of reducing federal habeas corpus petitions coexist
with the requirement that a state prisoner only be held in custody
after a lawfully-obtained conviction.
Part I will discuss the current state of federal habeas corpus and
the increasing ineffectiveness of obtaining meaningful relief from
constitutional errors during both collateral and direct reviews of a
state criminal conviction. Part II will demonstrate how state trial
courts implicitly interpret constitutional claims under AEDPA stan-
dards as established by Supreme Court precedent despite the trial’s
focus on state evidence laws. Part II will also detail, by specific refer-
29. As indicated by this proposition, the scope of this Comment will focus on “trial
error,” which is defined as “error which occurred during the presentation of the case to
the jury.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307 (1991). Thus, this Comment does not
address challenges to a defendant’s sentence which generally do not relate to events occur-
ring during the guilt phase of the trial itself, although events occurring during trial may
also affect the sentence imposed. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491-92
(2000) (holding that other than the fact of a prior conviction, if a fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum is not submitted to a jury
during trial and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a judge’s finding of that fact during the
sentencing phase violates due process). Additionally, this Comment will not be addressing
claims that solely challenge factual findings made by a trial judge without also raising con-
stitutional concerns. This sort of claim would be raised pursuant to Section 2254(d)(2),
which is used to determine whether an appellate court, applying the normal standards of
appellate review, could reasonably conclude the state court’s findings were supported by
the record. See Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). This would also
exclude claims that challenge specific factual findings made by a state court, findings of
which are entitled to a presumption of correctness under Section 2254(e)(1). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1) (2006). Finally, this Comment will not be addressing claims based on facts
that would not be found in the trial record. This not only excludes specific issues such as
claims for ineffective assistance of counsel to the extent they rely on allegations of coun-
sel’s improper conduct from outside of the trial court proceedings, but it also categorically
excludes claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which challenge the state court decision
based on evidence presented for the first time on habeas review. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(2).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
Summer 2012] NEW CHAMPIONS OF THE GREAT WRIT 169
ence to claims involving the improper use of propensity evidence, how
a federal habeas court defers to the trial court’s interpretations under
AEDPA’s deferential standard, thereby contributing to the overall un-
likelihood of obtaining habeas corpus relief. Part III will re-emphasize
the need for state courts to apply federal laws, in addition to state laws,
when reviewing a state criminal conviction. Part III will also briefly
summarize Steven Semeraro’s proposed “Reasoning-Process Review
Model” and indicate its weaknesses. While Semeraro’s proposal moves
federal habeas corpus jurisprudence in the right direction to the ex-
tent that it emphasizes the need to hold state courts accountable for
applying proper federal constitutional law, it falls short in its proposed
remedy for those state courts that failed to fulfill their obligations
under the reasoning-process review standard. Part IV will identify this
Comment’s proposed solution, why it should be adopted, and any po-
tential shortfalls.
I. The Decreasing Likelihood of Obtaining Relief After Trial
A. Federal Habeas Corpus is Now an Inadequate Remedy
An empirical study of federal habeas cases filed between 1992 and
2006 by state prisoners under AEDPA found that the number of
habeas petitions have increased; both the times that elapse from state
conviction to filing of the habeas petition, as well as from filing to the
disposition thereof, has increased; yet, the rate at which the writ is
granted has decreased.31 The Vanderbilt Study appears to be the most
recent and comprehensive attempt to survey the state of habeas
corpus jurisprudence post AEDPA. The following section summarizes
the Vanderbilt Study’s findings and recommends that the writ of
habeas corpus should not, as a practical matter, be relied upon. Statis-
tically speaking, there is virtually no likelihood of obtaining relief
from unconstitutional trial error on federal collateral review.32 The
only way to justify these numbers without sacrificing adequate review
of a petitioner’s constitutional right of habeas corpus is if, as this Com-
ment ultimately concludes, the error was dispositively addressed at
first sight by the initial trial court.
31. See generally NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRIS-
ONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 54-86
(2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf [hereinafter
VANDERBILT STUDY].
32. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
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It is first worth noting that AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations
requirement whereby a state prisoner must seek federal habeas corpus
relief within one year of the conclusion of either the direct appeal of a
state judgment or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.33
The statute of limitations provision was designed to reduce the time
between a state court conviction and the review of that judgment in
federal habeas corpus proceedings by encouraging petitioners to be
prompt with the filing of their claims in federal court. However, the
average period between conviction and review has actually increased
from about five years before AEDPA to over six years.34 Even consider-
ing the cases that properly survived the statute of limitations obstacle,
the average filing period is 5.6 years, which is half a year more than
the average filing period prior to AEDPA.35 The Vanderbilt Study sug-
gests the increase in filing time could be the result of an increase in
the average time for direct and collateral review of the criminal judg-
ments in state court.36 Although the study indicates there is currently
no empirical information available to test this hypothesis, other find-
ings in the study tend to support the proposed explanation.37 In any
event, the federal circuits are split as to whether a delay in a state
review process, as a threshold matter, constitutes a cognizable consti-
tutional claim on federal habeas review.38
Habeas petitioners also face an overburdened federal habeas
docket as well as a lengthy review process despite having only a dim
light of hope at the end of the tunnel. Not only are there more claims
raised on average in each federal habeas case, but the proportion of
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006).
34. VANDERBILT STUDY, supra note 31, at 55.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., id. at 54 (“Most prisoners who are convicted of felonies have served their
sentences by the time their state appeals have been completed.”).
38. Compare Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 523 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) (2006)) (denying habeas relief—on a claim that a delay between a habeas
petitioner’s state sentencing and the filing of his direct appeal violated right to due pro-
cess—because “no ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States’ recognizes a due process right to a speedy appeal” and that the case
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), established only the right to a speedy trial, not a
speedy appeal), and Jackson v. Duckworth, 112 F.3d 878, 879–80 (7th Cir. 1997) (same as
applied to claim for delay in state collateral, rather than direct, review), with Mims v. Le-
Blanc, 176 F.3d 280, 282 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying the Supreme Court’s approach to
claims for violation of speedy trial under Barker to claims for violation of speedy appeal on
habeas review), United States v. Smith, 94 F.3d 204, 207–08 (6th Cir. 1996) (same), Sim-
mons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1169 (3d Cir. 1995) (same), Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d
715, 719 (2d Cir. 1991) (same), and United States v. Johnson, 732 F.2d 379, 381–82 (4th
Cir. 1984) (same).
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cases with four or more claims raised in their habeas petition has also
increased greatly.39 One of the hypothesized explanations for the
jump in the number of petitions with four or more claims is that many
petitioners simply re-state the same claims that were raised and al-
ready disposed of earlier in their state post-conviction proceedings.40
On top of this, even with all the petitions that are immediately dis-
missed on procedural grounds, federal courts are nonetheless reach-
ing the merits of claims in a larger percentage of cases than they did
before AEDPA.41 The result is a clogged and overworked federal
habeas docket in which the court is reviewing claims that have already
been raised and denied on their merits by state courts.42 Not surpris-
ingly, the overall time it takes for a federal habeas court to close a
habeas petition has increased on average since AEDPA.43 As a result, a
habeas petitioner who was convicted in a non-capital case will remain
in custody for an average of one year before ever receiving a ruling
from the federal court.44 Nevertheless, the circuits generally agree
that long delays in habeas processing do not entitle a petitioner to
federal habeas relief.45
The Vanderbilt Study’s most compelling finding must be that the
rate at which the writ is granted by district courts has dropped.46
Whereas one in 100 cases resulted in relief prior to AEDPA, the study
found only seven cases in which relief was granted post-AEDPA out of
a sample of 2384, a rate of only one in 284 cases.47 Of particular im-
portance, the Vanderbilt Study points to the deferential standard of
review for state determinations of legal questions as one provision of
39. VANDERBILT STUDY, supra note 31, at 57.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 58.
42. This proposition is under the assumption that the petitioners had properly ex-
hausted their claims in state court. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
43. VANDERBILT STUDY, supra note 31, at 59.
44. Id.
45. Compare Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to
make a determination whether a long delay in habeas processing violates due process),
Hale v. Lockhart, 903 F.2d 545, 548 (8th Cir. 1990) (categorically rejecting the argument
that a petitioner is entitled to federal habeas relief “merely because a federal district court
is slow in adjudicating a collateral attack on his state conviction”), and Hassine v. Zimmer-
man, 160 F.3d 941, 953 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that while petitioner did experience exces-
sive delay in the district court’s processing of petitioner’s petition, which may have given
rise to a due process violation, petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief), with Carter v.
Thomas, 527 F.2d 1332, 1333 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that a twenty-one month delay
before a federal petitioner may be approved to file a formal complaint may state a claim of
“extreme and unreasonable delay” upon which relief may be granted).
46. VANDERBILT STUDY, supra note 31, at 58.
47. Id.
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AEDPA that may explain the lower grant rate; however, the study ulti-
mately concludes that without also examining appellate outcomes, it is
unknown whether AEDPA has reduced the overall rate of relief for
non-capital habeas petitioners.48 As the next section demonstrates,
the state appellate process may also be a contributing factor.
B. Direct Review: An Equally Unsatisfying Option
Habeas petitioners are not just cursed with an ineffective collat-
eral review process. Relying on potential relief through direct review
may be equally unsatisfying. Although it has long been recognized
that there is no constitutional right to an appellate process for crimi-
nal defendants,49 if the state has affirmatively afforded such a right “as
‘an integral part of the . . . system for finally adjudicating the guilt or
innocence of a defendant,’” the state has an obligation to comport
with the demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the U.S. Constitution.50 Indeed, direct review, rather than collateral
review, is the principal avenue for challenging a conviction. As stated
by the Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson:
“When the process of direct review . . . comes to an end, a pre-
sumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction and sen-
tence. The role of federal habeas proceedings, while important in
assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and
limited. Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state
trials.”51
A habeas petitioner is statutorily required to exhaust his state ju-
dicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through state collateral
proceedings, by presenting the highest state court available with a fair
opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim that the
petitioner seeks to raise in federal court.52 Although the exhaustion
requirement was created as a matter of comity,53 it may likewise harm
a petitioner’s chances at relief at any level of review. This Comment
does not seek to expand on the literature that is already replete with
criticisms on how “exhausting” this state exhaustion requirement may
48. Id. at 59.
49. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
50. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
18 (1956)).
51. 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)).
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)–(c) (2006); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515–16
(1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981).
53. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133–34 (1987).
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become for a habeas petitioner.54 It is worth mentioning, however,
that most prisoners who were convicted of felonies have already
served their sentences by the time their state appeals have been com-
pleted.55 This presents an especially troublesome issue given that once
they have served their sentences, former prisoners are no longer enti-
tled to habeas relief under AEDPA.56
Moreover, the potential for erroneous decisions on state appeal,
and consequently the criminal defendant’s ability to avoid fundamen-
tal unfairness, may be greater than one would feel comfortable admit-
ting. To begin, state appellate courts are heavily overburdened.57 As
the volume of appeals increases, so does the use of procedural short-
cuts such as screening procedures, eliminating oral arguments, and
truncating appellate opinions.58 These shortcuts, however, can have
devastating effects on the court’s ability to properly review the consti-
tutionality of a state defendant’s criminal conviction.59 Problems arise
not only when state appellate courts review a trial court’s records, but
additional concerns surface when they are forced to make their own
54. See, e.g., Matthew L. Anderson, Note, Requiring Unwanted Habeas Corpus Petitions to
State Courts for Exhaustion Purposes: Too Exhausting, 79 MINN L. REV 1197 (1995) (noting the
federal courts’ inconsistent application of the state exhaustion requirement of AEDPA and
recommending that they adopt a flexible approach to determining whether to dismiss a
habeas petition for failure to exhaust state remedies as opposed to a strict rule requiring
prisoners to petition the state courts in all instances).
55. VANDERBILT STUDY, supra note 31, at 54 (citation omitted).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006) (“[A] district court shall entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court . . . .” (emphasis added)). While the petitioner may still be entitled to a writ of error
coram nobis, which affords a remedy to attack a conviction and sentence even after a peti-
tioner has served his or her sentence and is no longer in custody, see United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 503–05 (1954), an analysis of such a remedy is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
57. JUD. ADMIN. DIV., AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS 2
(1994) (“The appellate courts of virtually all American jurisdictions now confront an enor-
mous increase in their workloads.”).
58. Alex S. Ellerson, Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural Reform, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 373, 390 (1991).
59. Id. (“While these procedures can have some beneficial effect on the speed with
which appeals are processed, they can also impinge upon, or even eviscerate, the defen-
dant’s right to appeal.” (footnote omitted)); but see JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE
APPELLATE COURTS ix–xii (2002) (arguing that despite the assumption that increasing
caseloads have impinged on judges’ abilities to bestow justice, certain organizational fea-
tures of the appellate courts allow the courts to maintain an effective balance between the
traditional image of individual judicial decision-making and the judges’ growing interde-
pendence on their court staff to increase the number of cases decided without sacrificing
the ability to effect justice).
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factual findings.60 Despite the potential for error, a defendant’s con-
viction might never be reviewed by the state’s highest court since dis-
cretionary review is rarely granted.61 Once these factual findings are
made, with or without a state supreme court’s check on the appellate
court’s work, AEDPA’s deferential standard once again comes into
play to solidify the conviction.62
The slim likelihood of obtaining relief at the federal level, cou-
pled with the deficient qualities of the state appellate courts, contrib-
utes in large part to the lower grant rate of federal habeas corpus
relief.
II. When in Doubt: Defer, Defer, Defer
A state prisoner can only obtain federal habeas relief on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the U.S. Constitution or
federal law.63 Habeas petitioners often raise claims alleging federal
constitutional violations that arose from conduct that occurred during
their daily state trial proceedings.64 By characterizing their claims
under this type of language, petitioners attempt to transform their
arguments into a cognizable federal habeas claim. Yet, since they were
faced with juries comprised of state citizens who are instructed on
state laws by state judges making state evidentiary rulings after hearing
arguments from state attorneys, one can imagine the amount of peti-
tions that are denied as not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding
because the claim only states a violation of state law. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court recently stated with unequivocal clarity, “it is only non-
compliance with federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment
susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts.”65 The Court’s
60. Leonard N. Sosnov, No Mere Error of State Law: When State Appellate Courts Deny
Criminal Defendants Due Process, 63 TENN. L. REV. 281, 311 n.150 (1996).
61. See, e.g., Dolny v. Erickson, 32 F.3d 381, 384 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that the state
appellate court decisions in Minnesota and Florida are usually “the end of the road” (quot-
ing Williams v. Wainwright, 452 F.2d 775, 776 (5th Cir. 1971)), abrogated on other grounds by
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-46 (2004).
62. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546–47 (1981) (pre-AEDPA case holding that Sec-
tion 2254(d) requires deference by federal courts to factual determinations of all state
courts without making any distinction between factual determinations of a state trial court
and those of a state appellate court).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006).
64. But see VANDERBILT STUDY, supra note 31, at 26–27 (finding that from a survey of
1837 non-capital cases, nearly one in five cases did not challenge the underlying state judg-
ment at all, and from a survey of 1521 non-capital cases, at least twenty-one percent of
them raised challenges to their sentence alone).
65. Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam).
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statement is undisputable, and rightfully so. As one scholar noted,
“[w]hen it comes to state law issues, where the state courts have partic-
ular expertise in their legal structure and have greater experience
with the issues than the federal courts, there is an increased need for
hesitation before declaring the state court action unconstitutional.”66
Further, a petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a fed-
eral one merely by asserting a violation of due process.”67 If the law
were construed otherwise, all claims raised in state court would be
cognizable on collateral review, and the value of comity would
depreciate.
While the above comments have often been used, in one form or
another, in conjunction with the standard under § 2254(d)(1),68 they
incorrectly assume the existence of some sharp, easily distinguishable
divide between what may only be recognized as a state law claim and
what may ultimately amount to a violation of the U.S. Constitution.
This is a superficial characterization that cannot always be so con-
strued, especially given the nature of criminal trials, in which legal
adversaries constantly dispute the constitutionality of depriving a per-
son of their right to liberty. There is always the potential that a trial
error in a criminal proceeding could become so egregious that it
amounts to a constitutional violation. Of course, this is not to say that
state trial judges are inept or lack the ability to detect, understand,
and apply federal constitutional principles while they preside over the
criminal trial. Rather, the concern is trial judges may not be as mind-
ful of Supreme Court precedent, as required under § 2254(d)(1),
when making determinations of state law. Of course, it is common
understanding that the role of a trial court is to act as the trier of fact
and the appellate court to review for legal error:
[A] presumed competence extends to appellate judges of any ap-
pellate court because of their limited and focused role. Also, unlike
trial judges, appellate decisions are made in a calm, reflective at-
mosphere. Appellate judges have the benefit of group decision-
66. Sosnov, supra note 60, at 307–08.
67. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996).
68. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“Today, we reemphasize
that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determina-
tions on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to de-
ciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (stating that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
shall not be granted unless it violated “clearly established Federal law” (emphasis added)).
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making with the combined thinking and exchange of ideas among
several judges.69
Still, in deciding whether a state conviction violates the U.S. Con-
stitution, a federal habeas court often gives due deference to the state
trial court’s determination of federal constitutional issues as they
come up during the heat of trial.70 This deference persists despite a
trial court’s primary focus on state law issues.
A. Are Trial Judges’ State Evidentiary Rulings Concerned with
Federal Constitutional Law?71
According to the Vanderbilt Study, almost twenty percent of the
non-capital cases surveyed included at least one challenge to a trial-
phase rule admitting or excluding evidence other than a confession
or a statement and other than a ruling based on the Fourth Amend-
ment.72 Though the number of federal habeas cases that involve a
69. Sosnov, supra note 60, at 308 (footnotes omitted). With that said, however, there is
still the concern for erroneous decisions on direct review. See supra Part I.B.
70. Of course, it is true that the state court “decision” to which Section 2254(d)(1)
applies, and accordingly, which a federal habeas court reviews, is the “last reasoned deci-
sion” of the state court, which necessarily refers to the decisions of the state’s higher
courts, not the lower trial court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991). How-
ever, as recognized by the Ninth Circuit, “[a]lthough ‘AEDPA generally requires federal
courts to review one state decision,’ if the last reasoned decision adopts or substantially
incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court decision, we may consider both
decisions to ‘fully ascertain the reasoning of the last decision.’” Edwards v. Lamarque, 475
F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir.
2005)). This may also involve a trial court’s reasoning of a constitutional issue that was
presented at trial. Furthermore, it is safe to say state prisoners petition to the federal courts
for relief only because the reviewing state courts found either that the trial court did not
commit any constitutional error at trial, or that the court did not commit error of sufficient
magnitude to warrant reversal. Cf. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784–85 (2011)
(reviewing a state court’s one-sentence order denying relief and noting “[w]hen a federal
claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be
presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits” as part of a threshold
requirement before Section 2254(d)(1) can apply). Otherwise, there would not be any
point to petition to the federal courts if the state courts had already found reversible error.
In any event, this shows that the trial court’s own determination of whether trial error rose
to federal constitutional dimension is of sufficient influence to warrant careful analysis
thereof.
71. Although this Comment concerns only state-level trials governed by state rules of
law, the following section will detail a number of evidentiary provisions under the Federal
Rules of Evidence because most states have adopted them in whole or in part. See 6 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, NOTE T (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997) (stating that forty-two states have adopted rules patterned on
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and nine jurisdictions have not adopted rules based on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, but that the rules have nonetheless influenced the law of
evidence in many of those jurisdictions).
72. VANDERBILT STUDY, supra note 31, at 29.
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challenge to a state trial court’s evidentiary ruling is high, the number
of grants of relief remains insignificant. This is likely because the fail-
ure to comply with state rules of evidence is not subject to federal
habeas review, thereby implying a federal court’s deference to the trial
court’s determination thereof, unless: (1) a specific constitutional
guarantee is violated;73 or (2) the error is of such magnitude that the
result is a denial of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due
process.74 In Jammal v. Van de Kamp,75 the Ninth Circuit held that only
if the jury may not draw permissible inferences from the evidence can
its admission violate due process under either standard.76 The follow-
ing section demonstrates that although state judges preside over crim-
inal trials as governed by state rules of evidence, they will necessarily
make rulings that relate to the same federal laws noted above with
which a federal habeas court is concerned under § 2254(d)(1).
To the extent a trial judge is required to make an evidentiary
ruling based on an isolated review of the evidence under Jammal,
there is little cause for concern. When a trial judge is confronted with
the obligation to make a quick ruling on an objection to the admis-
sion of evidence, the judge is very well capable of analyzing, by sole
reference to state law, the relevance and admissibility of the evidence,
its purpose in trial (i.e., whether it is intended to prove the truth of
the matter asserted), and, most importantly, its effect on the jury.77
Indeed, the judge may provide the jury with a limiting instruction to
admonish them on the appropriate purpose for which evidence is ad-
73. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991).
74. See Hill v. U.S., 368 U.S. 424, 428–29 (1962); accord Coningford v. Rhode Island,
640 F.3d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 2011); Wheeler v. Thaler, 347 F. App’x 981, 982 (5th Cir. 2009);
Steward v. Workman, 270 F. App’x 736, 739 (10th Cir. 2008); Bey v. Bagley, 500 F.3d 514,
519–20 (6th Cir. 2007); Bucklew v. Luebbers, 436 F.3d 1010, 1018 (8th Cir. 2006); Henry v.
Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999).
75. 926 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1991).
76. Id. at 920; accord Rasheed v. Moore, No. Civ. 03-2036(FLW), 2006 WL 319299, at
*6 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2006).
77. Accordingly, as one scholar noted, a flexible system such as the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which provides substantial discretion to trial judges, rather than a more detailed
and restrictive evidence code, promotes:
[T]ruth as well as rules that allow judges to consider all the legal issues and fac-
tual evidence, the unique emotional aura of the trial, the jurors’ intelligence, and
the peculiar identities of the parties, . . . [and] can [also] accommodate a trial
judge’s cumulative assessment of the total prejudice injected into a particular trial
against one or both litigants.
Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV.
413, 460 (1989).
178 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
mitted,78 an instruction which jurors are presumed to follow.79 When
such a curative instruction is issued, a court presumes the jury disre-
garded inadmissible evidence and no due process violation oc-
curred.80 So far, there are no federal constitutional implications that
would merit close habeas corpus analysis.
When counsel objects to the admissibility of evidence, however,
the trial judge is likely to focus his attention on the evidence in isola-
tion rather than contemplate its effect on the entire trial. A trial
judge’s limited focus in this sense does present a problem for habeas
petitioners because on habeas corpus review, the admissibility of evi-
dence is not only reviewed individually, as is the case when presented
to the judge at trial, but it is also evaluated in relation to all of the
evidence collectively.81 A federal habeas court conducts this form of
analysis in order to determine the evidence’s influence on the jury’s
ultimate verdict pursuant to Brecht v. Abrahamson.82 To this extent, the
trial judge may no longer elicit sympathy for having to deal with evi-
dentiary disputes firsthand and making determinations thereof on the
spot; although a daunting task, it is generally only excusable on direct
review.83 Thus, one may argue that state trial judges are not in the
proper position, as compared to a reviewing court, to determine the
constitutionality of a conviction on the basis of an evidentiary chal-
lenge before the criminal defendant is placed into custody.
On the other hand, even the Supreme Court in Brecht acknowl-
edged that state courts have “a superior vantage point from which to
evaluate the effect of trial error.”84 To illustrate, the trial judge is likely
78. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 105 (“If the court admits evidence that is admissible . . . for a
purpose—but not . . . for another purpose—the court, on timely request, must restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”).
79. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985) (Absent “extraordinary situa-
tions,” the Court “presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely
the particular language of the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case and strive to
understand, make sense of, and follow the instruction given them”).
80. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 & n.8 (1987).
81. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993) (analyzing trial error “in light of
the record as a whole.”).
82. See id. at 637.
83. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidentiary rulings are analyzed by appel-
late courts under a limited “harmless error” rule, which acknowledges that some evidence
rulings are inherently difficult calls in part because a trial court must make evidence rul-
ings quickly, and which cautions appellate courts to “give trial courts some right to be
wrong.” Mengler, supra note 774, at 426-27; see also FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (“A party may claim
error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of
the party . . . .”).
84. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 636.
Summer 2012] NEW CHAMPIONS OF THE GREAT WRIT 179
to have access to information about evidence that the jury will hear in
subsequent testimony and can thus predict its prejudicial effect on the
jury before it is formally presented at trial. For example, motions in
limine are brought before the trial begins and enlighten the trial
court on the specific nature of any allegedly objectionable evidence
before it is ever presented to the jury.85 Moreover, the grant or denial
of a motion in limine does not constitute a final ruling on the admissi-
bility of the evidence; rather, it is interlocutory in nature such that it is
only a preliminary expression of the court’s opinion as to the admissi-
bility of the evidence.86 Thus, the trial judge is informed of the poten-
tially admissible evidence in advance and need not make any hasty
evidentiary determinations until the parties first receive a preliminary
decision from the trial judge on the issue and only after evidence is
later presented at trial. The court may even adjust a prior ruling on a
motion in limine during the course of the trial in the event unantici-
pated evidence is presented.87 The authority to rule on motions in
limine rests on the inherent power of the trial judge to avoid the im-
pact of unfairly prejudicial evidence upon the jury and to take any
precautions necessary to guarantee a fair trial for all parties.88 This
example suggests that it is not outside the role of the state trial judge
to rule on the admissibility of evidence based on its potential effect on
the jury’s ultimate verdict, and consequently, its effect on a defen-
dant’s constitutional rights to a fair trial under Brecht.
Additionally, trial judges have access to information about evi-
dence that has already been presented and which is then used to form
the basis of their analysis in later evidentiary rulings. Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, authorizes a trial court to “ex-
clude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice” or by considerations of
trial efficiency.89 Although the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Holmes v. South Carolina90 that well-established rules of evidence, such
as Rule 403, are generally permitted,91 the Court first noted that deci-
sions to exclude evidence are inherently connected to, and thus may
adversely affect, a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights:
85. FRANCIS C. AMENDOLA ET AL., 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 613 (2006).
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. Id. at §§ 613, 615.
89. FED. R. EVID. 403.
90. 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
91. Id. at 326.
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“[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the
Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal
trials.” This latitude, however, has limits. “Whether rooted directly
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the
Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amend-
ment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a mean-
ingful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” This right is
abridged by evidence rules that “infring[e] upon a weighty interest
of the accused” and are “‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve.’”92
State trial judges implicitly render decisions that affect a defen-
dant’s right to have a criminal conviction free from reversible
prejudice under Brecht, even when they focus only on rules to exclude
evidence under state evidence law. This is because they are constantly
mindful of the totality of evidence that has already been presented at
trial. For example, balancing the probative value of evidence against
its prejudicial effect requires the trial judge to look at other evidence
already admitted against the party, in addition to the evidence in
question, before the trial judge can exclude evidence pursuant to
Rule 403.93 Another factor that a trial judge considers is the cumula-
tive effect of his Rule 403 rulings against one party and, consequently,
whether the judge excluded an equal amount of evidence under the
same rule against the other party.94 In both instances, state trial
judges, similar to a federal habeas court under Brecht, make rulings
with respect to one piece of evidence as it relates to other evidence
and its prejudicial effect on the jury.
Of course, the Brecht standard looks only to the jury’s ultimate
verdict, not just one line of similar evidence.95 Still, whether evidence
is viewed in isolation or in connection with other evidence, trial
judges are expected to maintain the fair trial guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment when making all evidentiary rulings. Nonetheless,
as the following section demonstrates, a federal habeas court is un-
likely to address claims challenging the admission of potentially preju-
92. Id. at 324 (citations omitted).
93. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 5215 (1st ed. 1982) (“In assessing prejudice, the court must look at other evi-
dence in the case as well as the proffered evidence.”).
94. 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:12 (3d
ed. 2007) (“[T]he trial judge should be evenhanded in administering Fed. R. Evid. 403. . . .
If a judge excludes evidence offered by one party in the exercise of her discretion under
Fed. R Evid. 403, then she should act in a similar fashion respecting similar evidence of-
fered by the other side.”); see also In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 321 (6th Cir. 1988)
(no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence under Rule 403 as to one party because trial
court administered its Rule 403 rulings “evenhandedly”).
95. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993).
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dicial evidence and will therefore leave it in the hands of the state trial
court to ensure a trial-level evidentiary error does not amount to a due
process violation.
B. No Relief Without “Clearly Established Federal Law”: A Closer
Look at Propensity Evidence
In O’Neal v. McAninch,96 two years after the Supreme Court de-
cided Brecht, the Court clarified the Brecht requirement by explaining
that on federal habeas review, the relevant inquiry in assessing the
magnitude of prejudice from a state trial error is, “Do I, the judge,
think that the error substantially influenced the jury’s decision?”97 If,
pursuant to the O’Neal inquiry, the court is convinced the error did
not sufficiently influence the jury, or had only a slight effect, the ver-
dict and the judgment should stand.98 If, however, the record is so
evenly balanced that a conscientious judge is in “grave doubt” as to
whether an error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence
on the jury’s verdict pursuant to the Brecht standard, the judge must
assume the error was not harmless, and the petitioner must win.99
This type of “narrow circumstance” occurred in O’Neal, which
prompted the Court to vacate the judgment and remand the case
back to the lower court for further proceedings.100 The dispute in
O’Neal involved a confusing jury instruction that had the potential to
mislead the jury.101 The O’Neal inquiry may also be relevant to the
analysis of “propensity evidence.” Rule 404(a) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence forbids the use of character evidence to prove any conduct
in conformity therewith: “Evidence of a person’s character or charac-
ter trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character or trait.”102 Propensity
evidence has been held excludable for the following reasons:
(1) [S]uch evidence lacks probative value, (2) it diverts the jury’s
attention from the merits of the case by inducing it to punish or
reward a party for being good or bad in general, (3) adverse char-
acter evidence saddles one involved in legal proceedings with disa-
bilities due to previous misconduct, (4) such evidence violates a
social commitment to the thesis that each person remains mentally
96. 513 U.S. 432 (1995).
97. Id. at 436 (internal quotations omitted).
98. Id. at 437.
99. Id. at 435–37.
100. Id. at 437, 445.
101. Id. at 435.
102. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
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free and autonomous at every point in his life, and (5) it is a sense-
less product of history.103
The prohibition of propensity evidence bears particular rele-
vance to the Brecht standard’s focal inquiry into the evidence’s effect
or influence on the jury’s verdict. This is because “[e]ven if the prose-
cution fails to prove the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt,
jurors may well convict not because they believe the defendant is
guilty of the current charges, but because he appears to be a person of
bad character.”104 Finally, even if a loophole105 applies to the general
rule against the use of propensity evidence, the trial court still has
discretion to exclude such evidence pursuant to Rule 403’s balancing
test because it may still create undue prejudice.106 Even though the
evidence might otherwise be admissible under a specified rule, and
the jury is properly instructed to consider it only for that limited pur-
pose, the jury nonetheless may not be able to follow the instruction.107
As a result, the jury is likely to view the evidence improperly as charac-
ter evidence that necessarily proves the defendant’s propensity to
commit the instant crime.108
Indeed, the Supreme Court implied in dicta that the admission of
evidence of prior crimes or other bad acts may amount to a violation
of due process under the right facts.109 In Alberni v. McDaniel,110 the
petitioner followed the same reasoning in arguing before the Ninth
Circuit that the admission at trial of his past violent actions and explo-
sive temper constituted improper propensity evidence that violated
his due process rights.111 To support his contention, the petitioner
argued “[th]e Supreme Court established a general principle that evi-
103. 1 BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
§ 4:18 (15th ed. 1997) (internal quotations omitted).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove [propensity, but t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose
. . . .”).
106. See 1 BERGMAN & HOLLANDER, supra note 103, at § 4:11 (“Rule 403 applies to all
types of evidence.”).
107. Id. at § 4:38.
108. Id.
109. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438–39 & n.6 (1983). The dissent in Mar-
shall more explicitly argued that the risk of prejudice alone from admitting a prior convic-
tion—provided the jury was given a proper limiting instruction—does not necessarily
outweigh its probative value under a balancing of the interests as to one set of facts, but
this was to be distinguished from another set of facts in which the admission of a prior
conviction, in addition to other present risks of prejudice, might tip the balance and com-
promise a specific federal right. Id. at 439 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. 458 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 2006).
111. Id. at 863.
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dence that ‘is so extremely unfair that its admission violates funda-
mental conceptions of justice’ may violate due process.”112 The Ninth
Circuit court recognized “every circuit, in cases decided prior to the
enactment of AEDPA, has acknowledged, at least implicitly, that the
improper introduction of evidence may violate due process if it ren-
ders a trial fundamentally unfair.”113 Given the unanimity of the
courts of appeals’ positions on the issue of whether the admission of
propensity evidence could ever violate due process, the court in Al-
berni described petitioner’s argument as “somewhat attractive.”114
Thus, a state trial judge’s incorrect evidentiary ruling—that a particu-
lar piece of evidence was not being used to prove a propensity to com-
mit a specific act—may very well satisfy the prejudice standard under
Brecht.
On the other hand, a habeas petitioner must first prove the exis-
tence of a constitutional error under § 2254(d)(1) before a federal
habeas court can analyze whether any error had a “substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” under
Brecht.115 If the rule were the other way around, a district court could
grant relief on prejudice grounds before ever determining whether
the claim amounted to a federal constitutional error under AEDPA.
That said, it bears repeating that a federal habeas petitioner cannot
obtain relief unless, before establishing prejudice, he first proves the
state court’s adjudication of his federal claim was “contrary to, or in-
volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. . . .”116 As the
statutory language makes clear, § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of
“clearly established” law to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.117 In
the absence of Supreme Court precedent that squarely addresses the
specific legal issue raised by the habeas petitioner, however, there is
112. Id. at 864 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)).
113. Id. at 865–66 (citing cases from the First through the Eighth and the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits).
114. Id. at 866.
115. Cf., e.g., Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795–96 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abra-
hamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)) (addressing harmlessness issue only for the sake of
argument after holding state-court decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable applica-
tion of Supreme Court precedent); Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)
(refusing to apply Brecht analysis because no constitutional violation occurred).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
117. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); see also § 2254(d)(1).
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no “clearly established Federal law” for purposes of AEDPA as to that
issue.118
As to the admission of evidence, the Supreme Court has not
made a clear ruling on whether irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evi-
dence violates the U.S. Constitution.119 In Estelle v. Mcguire,120 the Su-
preme Court denied a habeas petition challenging a conviction for
the murder of the petitioner’s daughter despite the petitioner’s argu-
ment that the jury instruction regarding evidence of the child’s prior
injuries constituted a propensity instruction.121 After holding there
was no reasonable likelihood that the jury considered the evidence of
prior injuries as propensity evidence, the Court concluded,
“[b]ecause we need not reach the issue, we express no opinion on
whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permit-
ted the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a
charged crime.”122
In response to the Supreme Court’s ambiguity, the Ninth Circuit
in Alberni v. McDaniel123 ultimately concluded that a petitioner’s due
process right—with respect to the right to exclude improper propen-
sity evidence—is not “clearly established” under AEDPA and therefore
cannot form the basis for federal habeas relief.124 The First, Second,
Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have unanimously agreed with this
reasoning.125
Thus, even if the improper admission of evidence was so prejudi-
cial that it may have rendered the entire trial fundamentally unfair,
some district courts may deny the claim simply because the Supreme
Court has not established a clear holding on the issue. What remains,
then, is the state trial court’s own determination of a state-law issue,
which may very well have evolved into a due process violation. Despite
the potential for reversible error, a trial court’s determination of a
118. See, e.g., Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) (requiring Supreme Court
precedent to “squarely address the issue”); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (de-
nying relief as to one issue because the Court never “required” the state courts to apply
particular case law to that issue).
119. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009).
120. 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
121. Id. at 74–75.
122. Id. at 75 n.5.
123. 458 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 2006).
124. Id. at 866–67.
125. See Coningford v. Rhode Island, 640 F.3d 478, 484–85 (1st Cir. 2011); Minett v.
Hendricks, 135 F. App’x 547, 553 (3d Cir. 2005); Vanwoudenberg v. Booher, 150 F. App’x
760, 761–62 (10th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Greiner, 56 F. App’x 38, 39 (2d Cir. 2003); Bugh
v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003).
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constitutional issue remains untouched in this respect since the Su-
preme Court expressly reserved the question open in Estelle v.
McGuire.
III. The Emphasis is on the States: A Review of the
Reasoning-Process Review Model and its Shortfalls
The above sections all point toward the need for state courts to
conscientiously and openly apply federal law when reviewing a crimi-
nal defendant’s conviction. The following section argues that Steven
Semeraro’s approach to federal habeas corpus jurisprudence in his
article, A Reasoning-Process Review Model for Federal Habeas Corpus,126 is
correct to the extent it encourages a state court’s attention to federal
issues. However, it falls short in several respects in its ultimate propo-
sal that the federal habeas court should be able to remand the case
back to the state courts for fuller consideration of the applicable fed-
eral constitutional law.
After criticizing the Supreme Court’s objective-reasonableness
standard under AEDPA as an incoherent standard for evaluating a
state court ruling on a federal constitutional question,127 Semeraro
worried that a confused habeas court interpreting the standard under
§ 2254(d)(1) would re-examine the merits of a state court decision no
matter how thorough a state judge’s opinion may be.128 This would
then cause state judges to put little effort into analyzing the federal
issue, knowing that the federal court will take care of the rest regard-
less of whether or not the state court’s result is correct.129 Semeraro
concluded the section by arguing for a test that both satisfies AEDPA’s
call for deference to reasonable state court applications of federal law
and fulfills the constitutional mandate that state courts thoroughly
and reasonably apply federal law.130 To the extent Semeraro argues
federal habeas courts give deference to state court decisions under
inappropriate circumstances while emphasizing the concern that state
courts are not appropriately applying federal law, Semeraro is abso-
lutely correct.
Semeraro’s solution can be summarized as a two-step inquiry for
the federal habeas courts to follow. First, did the state court cite all
126. Semeraro, supra note 16.
127. Semeraro, supra note 16, at 923–25.
128. Id. at 925.
129. Id. at 925–26.
130. Id. at 926–27.
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applicable federal law?131 Second, did the state court demonstrate a
thorough understanding and analysis of federal law?132 If either ques-
tion is answered in the negative, the federal habeas court could iden-
tify the weakness and remand the case back to the state court with
directions to more properly apply the correct federal law.133 Semeraro
argues that by ensuring the state courts actively engage in federal con-
stitutional jurisprudence while also supplying the reasoning behind
such application, the reasoning-process model would better justify the
deference afforded to the state court’s opinion under AEDPA.134
The reasoning-process model, however, raises a number of con-
cerns. First, Semeraro recognizes that initially, federal habeas courts
will often have to return cases back to the state courts.135 However, he
quickly disposes of the worry with a sentence-long assurance that,
sooner or later, state courts will get frustrated with the time-consum-
ing remands and end up complying with the new standard.136 Unfor-
tunately, there is no prediction how long the remand phase will last. It
is more likely, then, that the remedy will only prolong the time it takes
for a habeas petitioner to receive a final determination as to the con-
stitutionality of his custody. Furthermore, even if the federal habeas
court accompanied its remand order with instructions identifying how
the state court erred, the proposed solution would nonetheless con-
tribute to the overburdened state appellate court system.137 Finally,
and most importantly, Semeraro’s solution does nothing to compel
the state trial judge, who initially faced the constitutional issue at
trial,138 to justify his rulings on federal constitutional grounds.139 A
better solution would allow a court to dispose of the issues at the
outset.
131. Id. at 927–28.
132. Semeraro, supra note 16, at 928.
133. Id. at 929.
134. Id. at 941.
135. Id. at 929.
136. Id.
137. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
138. See supra Parts II, II.A.
139. When Semeraro used the proceeding in Ramdass v. Angelone to illustrate how the
reasoning-process review test would differ from existing habeas practice he concluded a
federal habeas court applying the standard would return the case to the state supreme court
to apply the applicable federal law, leaving the trial court’s role unchanged. Semeraro,
supra note 15, at 930–33.
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IV. The Civil Statement of Decision Applied to Criminal
Trials
While Semeraro’s proposal moves federal habeas corpus jurispru-
dence in the right direction by suggesting that state courts supply a
federal habeas court with a written record that accurately details their
identification, understanding, and analysis of federal constitutional is-
sues, Semeraro falls short by failing to propose a solution that would
address the potentially unconstitutional implications of trial error as
they first arise. The new focus for meaningful habeas corpus review
must be at the trial level.
A. The Proposal Defined
First, this Comment encourages state legislatures to adopt a post-
trial motion and proceeding that allows a criminal defendant, with
respect to a motion for new trial, to raise claims before the initial trial
judge alleging that what would have normally only constituted a state-
level trial error had actually evolved into a federal constitutional viola-
tion. The post-trial motion should be raised independently of any
state claims so that criminal defendants do not merely tack on a con-
stitutional violation to every state law claim.140 Second, a written state-
ment of decision should be statutorily required for trial court
determinations of constitutional issues that are raised in the post-trial
motions for new trial. Thus, if on collateral review the court sees the
state trial judge adjudicated the motion on the merits under the appli-
cable federal law, and the state court affirmed the decision on appeal,
the federal habeas court could reach the disposition of a petitioner’s
claim much more quickly. If the federal court unequivocally agreed
with the trial court’s written opinion, it could perhaps even summarily
deny the habeas petition.
The proposal that state trial judges should be held accountable
for addressing constitutional issues in written form is not the same as
Semeraro’s reasoning-process review. Semeraro’s approach seeks to
encourage a state’s higher courts to pay attention to constitutional
issues, but it does nothing to change the role of the lower trial
courts.141 Indeed, this solution represents a vast departure from all
currently proposed solutions in the sense that it emphasizes the need
to scrutinize a trial judge’s role in habeas corpus jurisprudence. Addi-
tionally, Semeraro’s approach is distinguishable because it proposes a
140. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
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federal court should defer to a state’s decision-making process in lieu
of AEDPA’s current objective-reasonableness standard.142 Similarly,
this Comment’s solution is distinguishable from Professor Bator’s ap-
proach in his article, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, in which he argues that federal courts should not
consider the merits of a federal constitutional claim if the defendant
had a fair opportunity to be heard on his claims in the state courts.143
Both Semeraro and Bator propose the standard of review under
AEDPA should change. To the contrary, this Comment argues for a
written statement of decision of a trial judge’s determinations of fed-
eral constitutional claims so that the standard of review under AEDPA,
as it is applied in its current and unchanged state, will be viewed by
the legal community as a more acceptable resolution of constitutional
claims that are raised pursuant to § 2254(d)(1).
B. The Utility of a Criminal Statement of Decision Process and its
Proposed Application
Currently, in the criminal context, it is uncommon for state trial
judges to put any legal determinations in writing, but instead they
communicate their rulings orally so that it may be transcribed by a
court reporter. In the civil context, however, judges are often required
to issue a written statement of their decision. In California, this is re-
quired under section 632 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.144
There is little reason why a similar procedure cannot be adopted
in the criminal context with respect to questions of federal constitu-
tional law. If states adopt a similar limitation as to the time for which a
142. Semeraro, supra note 16, at 926–27.
143. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
144. The court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal
basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial upon
the request of any party appearing at the trial. The request must be made within
10 days after the court announces a tentative decision unless the trial is con-
cluded within one calendar day or in less than eight hours over more than one
day in which event the request must be made prior to the submission of the mat-
ter for decision. The request for a statement of decision shall specify those contro-
verted issues as to which the party is requesting a statement of decision. After a
party has requested the statement, any party may make proposals as to the con-
tent of the statement of decision.
The statement of decision shall be in writing, unless the parties appearing at trial
agree otherwise; however, when the trial is concluded within one calendar day or
in less than 8 hours over more than one day, the statement of decision may be
made orally on the record in the presence of the parties.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 632 (West 2012).
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defendant may request a statement of decision, as well as a require-
ment that the requesting party identify with sufficient particularity the
specific constitutional issues for which the statement of decision is re-
quested, the post-trial motion will be able to narrowly define the issues
for the trial judge in a way that would prevent any excessive delays or
unnecessary compromises in judicial resources. A defendant’s failure
to comply with the specified rules would result in a waiver of the right
to request a statement of decision.
At the very minimum, state trial courts cannot refuse to hear a
federal constitutional claim even if the state legislature has yet to rec-
ognize it as a cognizable post-trial claim in a statute. For example,
California enumerates nine grounds for ordering a new trial.145 Al-
though the statute expressly limits the grant of a new trial to the listed
grounds only,146 the California Supreme Court in People v. Fosselman147
held “the statute should not be read to limit the constitutional duty of
trial courts to ensure that defendants be accorded due process of
law.”148 The California Supreme Court explained the state legislature
does not have the power to limit this constitutional obligation by fail-
ing to enumerate such claims in its statute.149 The Court bolstered its
analysis by noting the undeniable fact that “trial judges are particu-
larly well suited to observe courtroom performance and to rule on”
the constitutionality of such performances “in criminal cases tried
before them.”150 Finally, and of particular importance to this Com-
ment, the Court stated that “in appropriate circumstances justice will
be expedited by avoiding appellate review, or habeas corpus proceedings,
in favor of presenting the [constitutional issue] . . . to the trial court as
the basis of a motion for new trial.”151 Because neither the state trial
court nor the legislature may wholly prevent a criminal defendant
from raising a constitutional issue during trial-level proceedings,152
145. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1181 (West 2012).
146. See id. (“[T]he court may . . . grant a new trial in the following cases only . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
147. 659 P.2d 1144 (Cal. 1983).
148. Id. at 1150.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. (emphasis added).
152. They can, however, place restrictions on the availability of motions for new trial in
the interest of efficiency and finality, such as requiring a defendant to first raise the issue
by way of an objection during trial. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chase, 741 N.E.2d 59, 64
(Mass. 2001). This rule applies even when the claim is “one of constitutional dimension.”
Id. (“[E]ven when a claim is one of constitutional dimension, a defendant who has had a
fair opportunity to raise it may not belatedly invoke that right to reopen a proceeding that
has already run its course.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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state legislatures should incorporate this Comment’s proposal in their
statutes to promote a speedy, yet fair, administration of justice.
There are also a number of strategic opportunities available in
the statement of decision process for both prosecutors and defend-
ants. First, the parties and the judge, who actually participated in the
trial and are most familiar with the issues, will be in the best positions
to argue and adjudicate, respectively, whether a particular trial error
amounted to a constitutional violation. More importantly, as one
scholar noted, “[t]he Statement of Decision process provides for an
interaction between court and counsel regarding what a statement
should include.”153 In California’s statement of decision process, for
example, the court can assign the task of preparing a proposed state-
ment of decision to one of the parties, typically the prevailing party.154
Once the proposed statement of decision has been served upon the
parties, any party may file objections to the statement.155 The term
“objection,” however, does not mean the statement of decision pro-
cess is a means for challenging the court’s reasoning.156 Rather, it
alerts the court to any omissions or ambiguities in the statement.157
Counsel may even argue for any alternative theories of the issues or
request a direct statement from the court that the court has not
reached those issues, which may then be raised later on direct or col-
lateral review.158 In response to any objections, the trial court may
amend the statement of decision.159
Applying California’s statement of decision process to the instant
proposal, the prosecution would be able to draft the statement of de-
cision in a way that unambiguously resolves all the issues in favor of
affirming the constitutionality of the conviction. In response, the de-
fense may choose whether or not to file an objection.160 In the event
an objection is raised, the prosecution can urge the court to resolve
153. Robert H. O’Brien, The Success of Delay Reduction in the Civil Trial Courts, L.A. LAW.,
Mar. 2002, at 64, 65.
154. Robert A. Olson & Anne W. Braveman, Strategic Opportunities in the Statement of
Decision Process, THE VERDICT, 2nd Quarter 2005, at 42, 43.
155. CAL. R. CT. 3.1590(g) (West 2006).
156. Olson & Braveman, supra note 154, at 44.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 45.
159. Id. at 44.
160. Olson and Braveman argue it is to the losing party’s benefit not to vocalize any
objections because if the trial court does not resolve any challenged omissions or ambigui-
ties, the party eliminates the risk that any adverse rulings are construed against that party.
Id. at 44–45. The same considerations would be applicable to the instant proposal with
respect to the criminal defendant.
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the objection by suggesting a precise manner in which the court may
amend the statement of decision in a way most favorable to the prose-
cution. The result is a perfectly framed disposition of the constitu-
tional concerns the parties had just disputed with the issues still fresh
in their minds.
C. A Response to Anticipated Criticisms
One may argue this proposed solution is neither practical nor
constitutionally required. The sole purpose of the trial process is to
determine facts showing guilt or innocence, not to resolve questions
of law. Because a state trial judge’s primary responsibility is to adminis-
ter criminal law and procedure, it may be difficult to contemporane-
ously and dispassionately enforce a defendant’s federal constitutional
rights.161 Reviewing courts, on the other hand, are created to ensure a
second, more remote, decision-maker is “convinced that the convic-
tion was in accord with law.”162 Additionally, the Supreme Court held
it is not necessary for the state’s highest court to accompany the de-
nial of relief with a statement of its reasoning,163 nor is it even re-
quired for the court to cite federal precedent.164 If this is true with
respect to the highest state court, it most certainly cannot be constitu-
tionally required for a trial court to be held to such high expectations.
Still, a trial judge’s rulings to evidentiary challenges are inevitably tied
to notions of due process and the right to fair trial. Because there is
always the risk that a violation of a state law of evidence could be of
sufficient magnitude to trigger federal constitutional concerns, state
trial judges should be cognizant of these issues whether or not it is
constitutionally required of them.
One may also argue that the trial judge who initially made the
evidentiary ruling in question will not be so willing to admit his deci-
sion was inconsistent with the Constitution, even if true; hence the
need for post-conviction review from a different decision-maker.165
The response to such a pessimistic view of a trial judge’s ability to
comport with constitutional principles is that new constitutional rules
should not be designed with the evil judge in mind:
161. Semararo, supra note 16, at 916 & n.85.
162. Evitts v. Kentucky, 469 U.S. 387, 404 (1985).
163. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784–85 (2011).
164. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam) (“Avoiding [reversal under
AEDPA] does not require citation of our cases—indeed, it does not even require awareness
of our cases . . . .”).
165. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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Rulemaking is about ordering society in the best way possible. Even
if rulemaking is not grounded entirely on hope for a better way, it
proceeds, as it should, on the assumption that people charged with
implementing the rules will do so in a responsible way. Moreover,
no . . . rules can impede a trial judge bent on mistreating a liti-
gant. Particularly in the context of an ongoing trial, a biased judge
can abuse a litigant in a variety of subtle and largely unreviewable
ways. The judge’s demeanor, tone of voice, and facial expressions
toward the party and the jury, as well as toward the party’s counsel
and witnesses, can poison that person in the jurors’ minds. A trial
judge also can mistreat a litigant by intentionally reaching errone-
ous rulings. . . . The losing litigant, however, is forced to undertake
a costly appeal and second trial, often before the same judge. No
rules, however detailed, can prevent unethical trial judges from
treating litigants unfairly.166
A more optimistic, and in fact, realistic, view of the court system is
that state courts are actually not so hostile to federal law:
Today, isolated examples of state defiance of federal law remain,
but systematic breakdowns have not occurred for some time. At
least one study suggests that continued state hostility to federal
constitutional rights can no longer be presumed. And particularly
with respect to criminal procedure, the state courts have over-
whelmingly come to adopt federal law as their own. A decade ago,
Joseph Hoffman and William Stuntz concluded that “[t]he histori-
cal tension between state and federal law . . . has been almost com-
pletely eliminated in the criminal procedure context.” ”[I]n an
important sense,” they found, “the law of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments—our detailed, national Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure—today ‘belongs’ to state courts as much as it does to their
federal counterparts. . . . [S]tate courts deal with federal criminal
procedure law the same way federal courts do—as the sole source
of detailed rules that govern their criminal dockets.”167
The state trial judge may now have something tangible to point to
in the event his rulings are criticized on constitutional grounds. As to
the prosecutor, he may have guaranteed that his efforts to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt are now secured and supported by the
U.S. Constitution. Finally, the criminal defendant may be comfortably
assured that the trial judge was held accountable for any trial rulings
that may have risen to the level of an unconstitutional violation, to
which a federal habeas court would have given deference years later.
166. Mengler, supra note 77, at 465 (footnotes omitted).
167. Semeraro, supra note 16, at 912 (footnotes omitted).
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Conclusion
Not only are state trial judges constitutionally mandated to follow
federal law,168 but at the very least this proposal will force the same
judge who first faced the alleged error to justify his rulings on consti-
tutional grounds and in written form. One must also not forget the
Supreme Court’s longstanding principles of comity, federalism, and
finality.169 As Justice O’Connor so eloquently described: “In criminal
trials [the States] hold the initial responsibility for vindicating consti-
tutional rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate
both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-
faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.”170 This Comment sup-
ports these principles.
Many critics will maintain that the proposed solution will not
change AEDPA’s standards, increase the grant rate of federal habeas
corpus relief, or encourage the Supreme Court to expand its “clearly
established” jurisprudence. This is conceded. Indeed, federal habeas
corpus may never change. However, with a process that grants a crimi-
nal defendant a means to raise constitutional claims at the outset of
the alleged violation, coupled with the requirement for a written, well-
reasoned statement of the state trial judge’s vindication of those fed-
eral constitutional issues, the proposed solution should help quell any
worry that a state prisoner’s custody is in violation of the U.S.
Constitution.
168. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . .
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
169. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
170. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982).
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